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I

IN THE

SUPREME COURT
OF THE

STATE OF UTAH
THE AMERICAN OIL COMPANY, a
corporation,

Plaintiff and Appellant,

vs.

Case No.

UNITED STATES STEEL CORPORATION, a corporation, and FEDERAL INSURANCE CO., a corporation,

10326

Defendants and Respondents.

RESPONDENTS' BRIEF

STATEMENT OF KIND OF CASE
Appellant below commenced an action against a subcontractor on a State Road Commission construction contract to whom it had sold petroleum products. The complaint also named as defendants the principal and the
surety on a public contract bond secured by the parties, as
alleged in the complaint, "in compliance with . . . Section
14-1-1, Utah Code Annotated, 1953".
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DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
Default judgment was entered against defendant Gen.
eral Contracting Corporation. Both Appellant and Re.
spondents then filed motions for summary judgment. The
court below denied Appellant's Motion for Summary Judg.
ment, granted Respondents' Motion for Summary Judg.
ment and entered judgment against Appellant dismissing
its complaint with prejudice.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Appellant seeks:
a) Reversal of the order of the court below denying
its motion for summary judgment.
b) Reversal of the order of the court below granting
Respondents' motion for summary judgment.
c) Reversal of judgment of the court below dismiss·
ing Appellant's complaint with prejudice.
d) Granting of its motion for summary judgment
and entry of judgment in its favor and against Respon·
dent aocordingly.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The first three paragraphs contained in Statement of
Facts in Appellant's Brief appear to be accurate. The re·
maining portion of such "Statement of Facts" appears pri·
marily to be argument.
Since both parties to this appeal are relying upon mo·
tions for summary judgment filed with the court below, we
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will summarize as follows the pertinent uncontroverted
facts which were before the court below :
1.

September 25, 1961.

Respondent United States Steel Corporation, as principal, obtained from Respondent Federal Insurance Company, as surety, a statutory public contract bond in the
penal sum of $768,781.50 under the terms of which the
State of Utah, by and through its State Road Commission,
was the obligee (R. 5).
2.

October 4, 1961.

Respondent United States Steel Corporation entered
into a construction contract with the State Road Commission, the performance of which was the subject of said
bond (R. 4). Defendant General Contracting Corporation
was a subcontractor of Respondent United States Steel
Corporation under the terms of said contract (R. 32).
3.

December 11, 1961 through December 10, 1962.

Appellant supplied petroleum products to defendant
General Contracting Corporation at the Cart Creek Bridge
near the Flaming Gorge Dam site for which it billed defendant General Contraicting Corporation the sum of $3,725.10 (R. 34).
4.

December 13, 1962.

The performance of said contract was completed by
Respondent United States Steel Corporation (R. 42).
5.

May 2, 1963.
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D. Gordon Stringham, Senior Accountant, Estimates,
responsible for auditing, estimates and final accounts for
the State Road Commission of Utah made the following
administrative determinations for and on behalf of the
State of Utah by and through its State Road Commission
in his official capacity as Examiner and Auditor of the
accounts of said contract:
a) That the State of Utah had no claims to assert against either Respondent United States Steel
Corporation or against its surety, Respondent Federal
Insurance Company.
b) The amount due from the State of Utah to
Respondent United States Steel Corporation (R. 42).
6.

May 2, 1963.

"Final" field estimate was submitted on "estimate invoke" by said D. Gordon Stringham to Respondent United
States Steel Corporation (R. 44). The amount stated in
such final estimate dated May 2, 1963 was approved by
Respondent United States Steel Corporation and ultimately
was paid by the State of Utah to said Respondent (R. 4344).
7.

May 14, 1963.

Title 14, Chapter 1, Sections 1-4, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, upon which Appellant relies in its complaint,
was repealed.
8.

May 15, 1964.

Appellant filed its complaint in the court below rely-
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ing upon Title 14, Chapter 1, Utah Code Annotated, 1953.
9.

June 15, 1964.

Appellant obtained default judgment against defendant General Contracting Corporation in the sum of $3,773.00, plus interest, statutory attorneys' fees and court
costs (R. 16).
ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THE "THIRD-PARTY BENEFICIARY" THEORY AND ARGUMENT PRESENTED IN
POINTS I AND II OF APPELLANT'S BRIEF
WAS NEITHER RAISED NOR PRESERVED
IN THE RECORD ON APPEAL; THEREFORE,
NEITHER SUCH THEORY NOR SUCH ARGUMENT SHOULD BE CONSIDERED BY THIS
COURT ON THIS APPEAL.
The arguments made by Appellant in Points I and II
of its Brief are wholly foreign to the record on appeal. The
record contains no reference to any "third-party beneficiary claim". On the contrary, the record demonstrates that
Appellant's action was filed under and pursuant to the provisions of "Section 14-1-1, Utah Code Annotated, 1953"
(R. 2).

Appellant's complaint contains only one count. It clearly proceeds under and pursuant to the Public Bonding
Statute. Thus, in paragraph 6 of the complaint (R. 2)
Appellant specifically alleges that the execution of the
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bond by the principal was "in compliance with ... Section
14-1-1, Utah Code Annotated, 1953 ... " In paragraph 11
of the complaint, Appellant alleges a belief that there are
no other creditors - this too is a statutory prerequisite.
Other creditors, if any, must be included as parties to the
suit under the statute. In paragraph 12 of the complaint,
Appellant avers that it is entitled to a reasonable attorneys' fee by virtue of Section 14-1-4. In the default judgment taken against defendant General Contracting Corporation, pursuant to said complaint, Appellant obtained
judgment for such stautory attorneys' fees (R. 16).
The issues involved in this appeal were twice presented to the District Court, first on motion to dismiss the
complaint prior to answer (R. 9-10) and second on joint
motions of the parties for summary judgment (R. 37, 3940). On each of these occasions, Respondents filed memoranda in support of their respective motions, discussing the
facts alleged in the complaint, the theory of Appellant's
case as stated by the complaint and authorities and argument in support of said motions. These memoranda are
devoted wholly to the application of the respective bonding
statutes (R. 18-23, R. 55-64). No reply memorandum was
filed in response to either of these memoranda. No
amended complaint was filed and Appellant did nothing
of record to advise the court and the parties of a change
of position or theory.
Despite this state of the record, Appellant relies in its
brief primarily upon a common-law third party beneficiary
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doctrine. It seeks on this appeal to hang this theory upon
paragraph 9 of its complaint which reads (R. 2) :
"9. Pursuant to Exhibits 'A' and 'B', the defendant's contractor and surety also owe plaintiff
$3,773.00."
Paragraph 9 follows a recitation in the complaint that
Exhibit "B" is a statutory bond, that defendant General
Contracting Corporation was a subcontra.ctor and that the
subcontractor was liable to Appellant for petroleum products which it supplied to the subcontractor on the construction project. Paragraph 9, in this context, simply avers
that by reason of the statutory bond, Respondents also, in
::tddition to the subcontractor, are liable to Appellant. It
certainly does not state a common-law cause of action.
The contract itself (Exhibit "A") contains no thirdparty beneficiary covenants or provisions of any kind. Appellant, however, now relies upon the provisions of the
statutory bond which, by Appellant's own averments in
paragraph 6 of the complaint, was obtained in compliance
with the Public Bonding statute, to confer liability upon
the principal of the statutory bond on a common-law thirdparty beneficiary theory without the aid of either averment or proof that any such result was ever contemplated
by the parties. It is respectfully submitted that, even under our present broad rules of "notice pleading", paragraph 9 of Appellant's complaint certainly cannot be construed to allege a cause of action against the principal on
such theory, separate and apart from the statutory claim.
These Respondents clearly and reasonably interpreted
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Appellant's complaint to be filed under and pursuant to
Title 14, Chapter 1, Sections 1-4, Utah Code Annotated
'
1953. Their Motion to Dismiss served upon Appellant on
June 4, 1964 (R. 9-10), and their subsequent answer (R.
25-8) made the position of Respondents clear in this regard. If this were not Appellant's true theory, it certainly
had a duty, at absolute minimum, either to amend its complaint to state a claim based upon a common-law third-party beneficiary theory or to demonstrate of record that it
relied upon some theory not stated in its complaint.
The record is clear that Appellant below sought to
perfect judgment under rights created by statute. When
it became apparent that it had failed properly to comply
with required statutory conditions and that it was entitled
to no relief under the statute, it has sought, through this
appeal, to amend its pleadings, to alter its theory and to
obtain automatic judgment from this court. We submit
that it should not be permitted so to do. This court in
Pettingill v. Perkins, 2 Utah 2d 266, 272 P. 2d 185 ( 1954)
prohibited a party from making such a change in theory
on appeal. The court there stated at page 269 of the Utah
Reports:
"Having by his own pleadings, evidence and
instructions tried and rested the case upon the
theory that the mother's negligence would bar the
father, he is bound thereby, as the law of the case.
He cannot now on appeal shift his theory and po·
sition." (Emphasis added.)
Similarly, it has been held that where, as in the in·
stant case, one contractual theory is pursued at the lower
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court level, a new theory of contract recovery may not be
introduced on appeal. Lynn v. Seby, 29 N. D. 420, 151 N.
W. 31 (1915). See generally, 5 Am. Jur. 2d, Appeal and
Error, Section 569 (1962).
The precise question now before this court was before
the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts in Dix Lumber Company v. City of Boston, 289 Mass. 291, 194 N. E.
117 ( 1935). In that case, as here, the action was filed
under the State's Public Contractor's Bond Statute, but
the materialmen failed to comply with the statute's terms.
There, as here, on appeal, the claimant sought to pursue
a common-law third-party theory, exclusive of the statute.
The Massachusetts Supreme Court ruled that the thirdparty beneficiary theory could not be interjected on appeal
stating:
"We see nothing in this contention. Its petition
as well as the original pet~tion which began the
case alleges that the bond was given pursuant to the
statute and rights under a common-law bond cannot
be established in these proceedings which were
brought to enforce the security of the statutory
bonds . . . Furthermore, the findings of the master
show that it was the intention of all of the parties
to the bond given that it was executed and delivered
as a bond required by the statute. It is to be interpreted as carrying out that intent." (Emphasis
added.)
It is uncontroverted here that the bond was executed
and delivered by the parties "as a bond required by the
statute". We submit that the doctrine of the Dix Lumber
case is sound and should be followed by this court. Its ap-
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plication in this case is particularly apropos because of the
corollary rule of appellate practice that a matter should
not be considered on appeal if it is not properly raised and
preserved of record in the court below. This rule is stated
as follows in North Salt Lake v. St. Joseph Water & Irr.
Co., et al., 118 Utah 600, 223 P. 2d 577 (1950) :
"We are unable to pass on the contention that
the motion to dismiss should not have been granted
... The reason that we are precluded from considering this question is that issues were not framed
in the .court below. We cannot pass on matters
raised for the first time in this court."

ACCORD:

Huber v. Deep Creek Irrigation Company, et al., 6
Utah 2d 15, 305 P. 2d 478 (1956).
Rosander v. Larsen, 14 Utah 2d 1, 376 P. 2d 146
(1962).
Reliable Furniture Co. v. Fidelity & Guar. Ins. Under., 14 Utah 2d 169, 380 P. 2d 135 (1963).
Chumney v. Stott, 14 Utah 2d 202, 381 P. 2d 84
(1963).
Hamilton, et al. v. Salt La,ke County Sewerage Improvement Distri.ct No. 1, 15 Utah 2d 216, 390
P. 2d 235 (1964).
It is submitted, therefore, that the common-law thirdparty beneficiary claim of Appellant is at variance with
the pleadings and the record, has not been properly raised
and preserved by the Appellant and that this new theory

is not properly before this court.
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POINT II.
EVEN ASSUMING FOR PURPOSES OF ARGUMENT THAT THE COMMON-LAW "THIRDPARTY BENEFICIARY" THEORY AND ARGUMENT HAD BEEN DULY PLEADED AND
PRESENTED OF RECORD TO THE COURT
BELOW, THE ORDER AND JUDGMENT APPEALED FROM STILL SHOULD BE AFFIRMED BECAUSE THE ST AT UT 0 RY
RIGHTS SOUGHT TO BE ENFORCED BY APPELLANT ARE EXCLUSIVE.
Through Title 14, Chapter 1 entitled "Public Contract'', Utah Code Annotated, the Legislature of the State
of Utah has sought to protect the interests of mechanics
and materialmen on public contracts by imposing upon
political subdivisions of the State of Utah the option of
either requiring a bond to protect their interests or in the
alternative to waive sovereign immunity. In the event of
the latter election, the political subdivision of the State of
Utah can be sued as a private individual. However, a short
one year statute of limitations is prescribed. See Title 14,
Chapter 1, Section 3, Utah Code Annotated (now repealed)
and Title 14, Chapter 1, Section 7 (the present statute).
Section 2, Chapter 1, Title 14, pursuant to which Appellant's complaint was filed, specifically required the
supplying of a bond for the protection of mechanics and
materialmen, then imposed the following specific procedural requirements: (Title 14, Chapter 1, Section 2, Utah
Code Annotated, 1953.)
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1. If an action is filed by the obligee within six
months after completion and final settlement of the contract, any person who has furnished labor or materials may
intervene.
2. If no such action is filed by the obligee within six
months from the completion and final settlement of the
contract, any person who has supplied labor or materials
may sue the contractor and his surety:
a)

in the name of the obligee;

b)

in any court having jurisdiction in the County where the contract was to be performed;

c)

within one year after the complete perform·
ance and final settlement of such contract.

3. All claimants and creditors who do not intervene,
or assert and establish their claims, in such action, shall
be forever barred from recovery upon such bond.
Hence, whether the political subdivision chooses to require the bond or to waive Government indemnity, a strict
and short one year statute of limitations applies. It is per·
tinent to note that no such procedural requirements and
restrictions were placed in Title 14, Chapter 2 entitled
"Private Contracts", Utah Code Annotated, 1953. It fol·
lows that the Legislature obviously much more strictly con·
fined and limited statutory rights of mechanics and ma·
terialmen when furnishing services or materials on public
contracts.
As set forth in some detail herein under Point I, Ap·
pellant in its pleading affirmatively avers that the bond
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here involved was executed by the parties and issued "in
compliance with" Chapter 1 of Title 14. The bond itself
recites (R. 5):
"WHEREAS, it was one of the conditions of
the award of the Commission, pursuant to which
said contract is entered into, that these presents
should be executed."
It therefore cannot be disputed in this case that the
bond here involved was executed by the parties as a requirement of the State of Utah under the provisions of
former Title 14, Chapter 1, Sections 1-4. The Appellant
here was a member of the class to which the bonding statute was directed. This was a public contract. Appellant
supplied petroleum products to a subcontractor. Appellant
had no contractual relationship with the State of Utah,
with the prime contractor or with the surety. Had it complied with statutory requirements, Appellant would have
been entitled to file an action under the provisions of the
statute. It purported to do so, but failed to comply with
any one of the following statutory conditions:
a)

action to be filed in the name of the obligee,

b)

in Daggett County, and

c)

within one year.

The Legislature, in its wisdom, required the creation
of statutory "third-party beneficiary" rights in favor of
materialmen which had not theretofore existed to protect
them against the doctrine of sovereign immunity. Such
rights are subject to express statutory conditions and are
created by the statutory bond. The Appellant here admit-
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tedly must rely upon the language of the statutory bond.
That language should not be lifted from context. The en.
tire bond, together with the statutory provisions pursuant
to which it was executed and filed, must be considered to.
gether. Being faced with an adverse adjudication in the
court below holding that it had failed to satisfy the necessary statutory conditions, Appellant here seeks to escape
from the application of the provisions of the very statute
under which its complaint was filed. It seeks to appropriate unto itself the benefits of the statute without being
bound by the necessary and incidental statutory obligations.
This it should not be permitted to do.
In General Electric Supp. Corp. v. Willey Electric Co.,
47 Ohio App. 196, 191 N. E. 706 (1933), the court faced
precisely the same problem. In reasoning that the claimants should not be permitted to have their cake and eat it
too, the court there concluded:
"In the .case before us, to hold that the statu-

tory action was not exclusive, but that the common
law action still remained, would be to penalize the
indemnity company upon the failure of the claim·
ant to comply with the provisions of the act. In
other words, it would be to read into the contract
the statute which fixes liability on the indemnifier,
but to read out of the act any protection thereunder.
If the indemnifier is chargeable with notice of the
statutory provisions, so must the claimant be
charged therewith."
And in the final paragraph, the court said:
"We are therefore of the opinion that the law
of Ohio is that the statutory remedy is exclusive and
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the court properly sustained the demurrer to the
petition."
Similarly, in the case of Dix Lumber Company v. Boston, 289 Mass. 291, 194 N. E. 117 ( 1935), the court held
that a bond, executed and delivered as a bond required by
statute, must be interpreted as carrying out that intent,
and could give rise to no common-law action exclusive of
the statute. Long Dell Lumber Co. v. Carr Construction
Co., 172 La. 182, 133 So. 438 ( 1931) is to the same effect.
In Standard Sanitary Manufacturing Co. v. Southern
Surety Co., 59 S. W. 2d 291 (Tex. Civ. App. 1933) the court
took a slightly different approach. There, the problem was
the same. The claimant sought recovery upon a bond issued pursuant to statute without complying with statutory
procedures. The court there recognized the existence of
common-law rights under the provisions of that particular
bond but ruled that the remedies available to the claimant
were confined to those described by the statute. The court
said:
"Even though the bond created a common law
obligation independently of the statute, . . . since
the bond was given in reference to the demand of
the statute, it must be construed in connection
therewith and . . . the remedies afforded by the
statute were exclusive.
"Since such statute provided that an action
could not be brought on a bond given in compliance
with the terms thereof after one year from the
completion of the job, . . . an action could not be
maintained thereon after the expiration of said
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period of limitation even though the bond be construed as the common law obligation.

"It would not be reasonable to hold that a contractor and his surety, by reason of their having
executed a bond in response to the demands of the
statute, and in compliance with the terms thereof
for the purpose of protecting rights created by th~
statute, should, by virtue thereof, be held responsible for obligations not authorized by such statute."
This .case is particularly pertinent to an analysis of the
instant case inasmuch as there, as here, one of the questions involved was whether the statute of limitations built
into the contracting bond statute should apply or whether
the general statute of limitations for contracts should apply. The court clearly and reasonably held that the former
should be applicable.

It is pertinent to note again in this regard that a one
year statute of limitations is imposed by the statute
whether the governmental subdivision elects to require a
bond or to waive sovereign immunity. Appellant argues at
page 10 of its brief that the "general statute of limitations"
applies. If this were true, a one year statute would bar the
materialman if sovereign immunity were waived, but the
general statute of limitations would apply where an elec·
tion was made to require a statutory bond. This interpretation flies directly into the face of the clear and unam·
biguous language of the statute. Such an absurd result
certainly was never intended by the Legislature.
In the case of Indemnity Insurance Company v. South
Texas Lwnuer C01npany, 29 S. W. 2d 1009 (Tex. Com. App.
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1930) the court was faced with the same problem. After
analyzing and quoting the pertinent public contract bonding statute, the court said:
"The above statutes clearly imply that the remedy there accorded to the materialmen, to enforce
his cause of action arising under a bond such as
the one herein involved, whether the bond be regarded as a statutory bond or not, is exclusive, and
that his action on the bond is to be subject to the
provisions of these statutes."
One of the things which influenced the court in the
Indemnity Insurance Company case, was the fact that there
was such a significant disparity between the procedural
provisions of the contractor's bond statute itself and procedures applicable to general contracts. This is true in the
instant case as well since both the repealed statute and
the present statute contain much more detailed and explicit
procedural provisions than are applicable to the ordinary
contract action. Certainly, under these circumstances it
would appear that the Legislature intended that the remedies made available through these public bonding statutes
should be exclusive and that no other action should be
brought except under the terms of the statutes. Otherwise,
if the Legislature had intended the general statute of limitations and other procedural requirements to apply, it
would have enacted a statute similar to the private contracting provision in Section 14-2-1 which relies upon generally applicable common-law rules for jurisdiction, limitations of actions and party and notice requirements.
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The application of the public contract bond statute
is treated in Campbell Building Co. v. District Court of
Millard County, 90 Utah 552, 63 P. 2d 255. The court there
stated:
"The bond required by the statute to be given
by the contractor is for the purpose of protecting
mechanics and materialmen. Section 17-1-1, R. S.
1933. This statute is highly remedial for the benefit of and to provide security for all persons who
furnish labor and material on public work."
The statute also was treated by this court in State v.
Campbell Building Co., 94 Utah 326, 77 P. 2d 341. That
case is on all fours with the case at bar with respect to the
time upon which the statute of limitations commences to
run which will be discussed below. Appellant cites and
quotes from this case, asserting that it supports Appellant's
theory of "non-exclusive" application of the public bonding
statute. We submit that it does not. Appellant relies upon
the following statement from the court's opinion in that
case:
"Claims of creditors against the contractor are
not affected by the statute. We opine such .claims
may be asserted at any time within the general
statute of limitations."
However, the court then continues:

"It is only when it is sought to hold the surety
- only when recovery is to be made under the bond
- that the provisions of the statute come into play.
The restrictions are two-fold: to give the obligee
a priority to determine and protect any claim it may
have, and to fix a one year limitation on the surety's
liability to other creditors." (Emphasis added.)
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Certainly, as is stated above by the court, creditors of
the contractor would not be compelled to comply with the
bonding statute. The statute was not passed for their benefit. However, the Appellant here is not a creditor of the
contractor. His only conceivable claim is derived from the
language of the bond itself which admittedly was filed in
compliance with the statutory mandate. Furthermore, Appellant does here seek "to hold the surety". Both in the
court below and on this appeal, Appellant seeks judgment
against the surety on the bond. It follows that "the provisions of the statute come into play" and that having failed
to comply with the statute, Appellant's cause must fail.
Title 14, Chapter 1, Section 1 (now repealed) reads
in pertinent part:
"Every person entering into a contract for the
construction or alteration of, or addition to, any
public work, building, structure or improvement,
shall, before the work under any such contract is
commenced, be required to furnish a good and sufficient bond for the faithful performance of such
contract, and further conditioned that the contractor wvll promptly make payment to all persons supplying labor or materials used in the prosecution of
the work." (Emphasis added.)
It is submitted that the language from the bond upon

which the Appellant does and must rely is the very language required by the statute, that the remedies prescribed
by the statute are exclusive and that the failure of Appellant to comply with the statutory conditions is fatal to its
claim against the contractor and the surety of the bond.
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A very nice question could have arisen in this case as
to which statute applies. For example, it is clear from Appellant's complaint that it expressly relied upon Title 14,
Chapter 1, Utah Code Annotated, 1953. The bonding provision thereof (14-1-2) provided that "a right of action"
would accrue in favor of a materialman "six months" after
the completion and final settlement of the contract, providing that no action had been filed by the obligee on the
bond during that period. However, substantially prior to
the accrual of such "right of action" in this case, and on
May 14, 1963, Sections 1 through 4 of Title 14, Chapter 1
were repealed. Hence, the very statutory provisions under
which the complaint was filed were repealed before any
right of action accrued thereunder and before this action
was filed. Hence, it could be argued that the court below
had no jurisdiction whatsoever to entertain the claim under the provisions of the repealed statute and that Appellant's rights, if any, must be derived from the new provisions contained in Sections 5-9 of the repealing statute
(Title 14, Chapter 1).
However, it was not necessary below and it is not necessary here to determine which of the public eontract bonding statutes apply for the reason that Appellant complied
with the provisions of neither of them. Under the provisions of either statute, Appellant's complaint was properly
dismissed by the court below. The two statutes will be discussed below in sequence.
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POINT III.
APPELLANT IS NOT ENTITLED TO RECOVER AGAINST RESPONDENTS UNDER
THE PROVISIONS OF TITLE 14, CHAPTER 1,
SECTIONS 1-4, UTAH CODE ANNOTATED,
1953.
Appellant's complaint was filed under and pursuant
to the provisions of Title 14, Chapter 1, Sections 1-4, Utah
Code Annotated, 1953. Assuming, for purposes of this
discussion, that this statutory provision is applicable,
it does not benefit Appellant for the reason that Appellant
failed to comply with three necessary statutory conditions
which will be discussed below.
a)

Appellant was not a proper party and could
not properly maintain an action in its own
name under said statutory proviswns; such
action must be filed in the name of the obligee
on the bond.

Title 14, Chapter 1, Section 2 of the former statute
provides in pertinent part that a materialman may institute
a direct action against the contractor and his surety "in
the name of the obligee".
The obligee under the bond is the State of Utah, by
and through the State Road Commission of Utah. Appellant has no standing under the statute through which it
sought to invoke the jurisdiction of the court below under
its claimed statutory cause of action to prosecute the action in its own name and on its own behalf. The action
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must be maintained, if at all, in the name of the State of
Utah by and through the State Road Commission of Utah
for the benefit of and on behalf of the Appellant.
The requirement that the action be filed in the name
of the obligee is not an arbitrary requirement. One of the
purposes of the whole statutory procedure is to permit
only one civil adion, to require all creditors to join and
litigate their respective claims in the same action and to
reasonably apprise all potential creditors of the pendency
of such claims. An action on file entitled American Oil
Company v. United States Steel Corporation obviously
would not give laborers and materialmen notice of the pendency of a statutory cause of action in which they may
participate. On the other hand, if the statutory condition
is followed and the action brought in the name of the
obligee, for and on behalf of the claiming laborer or materialman, potential claimants would be alerted and would
have an opportunity to intervene as provided by the statute.
In its brief, Appellant relies upon Board of Education
V. Southern Surety Co., 76 Utah 63, 287 P. 332 (1930).
It is respectfully submitted that that case is wholly inapposite. There, the action was brought in the name of the
obligee. The plaintiff had standing to sue and the court
had jurisdiction over the parties and the subject matter.
That case holds only that the publication of notice to other
creditors was not jurisdictional. Because of the language
of the Board of Education case, Respondents did not raise
in their motion to dismiss and memorandum in support
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thereof or in their motion for summary judgment and
memorandum in support thereof the failure of Appellant
to publish notice to creditors.
However, this court treated the precise question here
involved in Utah State Building Commission, for. the use
and benefit of M ountaim States Supply Company v. Great
American Indemnity Co., et al., 140 P. 2d 763, 105 Utah
11, which is cited at page 5 of Respondents' memorandum
in support of their motion for summary judgment (R. 58).
That case, the only case in which this court has treated this
subject, is conspicuously absent from the list of authorities cited by Appellant. There, the obligee on the bond was
the Utah State Building Commission. The action was prosecuted in the name of the State Building Commission for
the use and benefit of the materialman. The defendant defended upon the ground that the Utah State Building Commission was not a "body politic or corporate" and that the
action should have been brought in the name of the State
of Utah. After ruling that the Utah State Building Commission was the obligee on the bond and was a proper body
politic or corporate, District Judge Crockett, writing the
opinion for the court, stated:
"The Utah State Building Commission was the
only proper obligee on the bond, and the only entity that could have properly brought this action."
Similarly, here, the State of Utah by and through the
State Road Commission of Utah was the only proper obligee
on the bond, and the only entity that could have properly
brought this action. The action, therefore, was properly
dismissed by the court below.
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b)

The District Court in Salt Lake County had
no jurisdiction to entertain an action under
said statutory provisions for the reason that
they require said action to be filed in the
County where the contract was to be performed.

The statute upon which Appellant relied in its complaint (former Title 14, Chapter 1, Section 2, Utah Code
Annotated, 1953) provides that a materialman may sue
the contractor and his surety, but that the action must be
filed in a "court having jurisdiction in the County where
the contract is to be performed." It is undisputed that the
contract here involved was to be performed wholly within
the confines of Daggett County, Utah.
Again, this condition is consistent with the basic purposes of the public bond statute. To protect the interests
of all possible laborers and materialmen, the Legislature
specifically required the filing of the action in the County
where the work was to be performed. If so filed, it would
be a simple matter for all interested materialmen to keep
themselves apprised of actions filed in the particular
County involved in the name of the obligee for their benefit. This vrould not be true if any particular materialman
could commence an action in any County in the State of
Utah.
Under Point III in its Brief, Appellant asserts that the
Federal Courts had construed "the Miller Act" to be "a
venue requirement and not one of jurisdiction". It is true
that some Federal cases have so held. However, we have
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not found a ruling by United States Supreme Court on
this issue, and the Federal authorities are in substantial
conflict. Representative Federal cases holding that the
Miller Act requirement (Title 40, Section 270 B, United
States Code Annotated) that the action must be brought
in the United States Distriet Court for the district "in
which the contract was to be performed and executed and
not elsewhere" limits the jurisdiction of the Federal court
are:

United States for the use and benefit of Greenville Equipment Co. v. U. S. Gas. Co., D. C. Del. 1962, 218
F. Supp. 653. In that case, the court stated the applicable
rule as follows :
1)

"This being an action under the Miller Act and
the contract in question relating to work in Delaware, this U. S. court for the District of Delaware
has the exclusive statutory jurisdiction."
2) U. S. for use and benefit of Fairbanks Morse &
Co. v. Bero Const. Corp., D. C. N. Y. 1957, 148 F. Supp.
295. In that case, the court stated the rule as follows:

"Jurisdiction under the statute is therefore
vested solely in the District Court for the Eastern
District of Virginia where such contract was to be
performed and executed. The requirement that the
action be brought in the District where the contract
was to be performed and executed is a jurisdictional requirement. It is not met by bringing suit
in this District which has no jurisdiction over the
controversy. United States, to use of New York
Plumbers' Specialties Co. v. Silverburgh Construction Co., D. C. E. D. N. Y., 10 F. Supp. 121; United
States, for use and benefit of Johnson v. Morley
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Construction Co., D. C. W. D. N. Y., 17 F. Supp.
378."
The Utah statute here involved by its express terms
constitutes a limited and conditional waiver of Governmental immunity. To obtain rights thereunder, materialmen
must comply strictly with the statutory conditions imposed.
Although the Utah Supreme Court has not yet resolved
this precise issue, it has ruled under a somewhat analogous situation that the conditions contained in a statutory
cause of action must be strictly complied with. Title 30,
Chapter 3, Section 1, Utah Code Annotated, 1953 provides
that the District Court may enter a decree of divorce where
"plaintiff shall have been an actual and bona fide resident
of this State and of the .county where the action is brought
for three months next prior to the commencement of the
action". In Weiss v. Weiss, 111 Utah 353, 179 P. 2d 1005,
this court ruled that where the statutory condition of residency within the County was not met that the District
Court had no jurisdiction and could not consider the case
on its merits. In that case, the District Court involved
found that the plaintiff was not a resident of the County
where the action was brought, then entertained the cause
on its merits and entered judgment against plaintiff. The
Supreme Court modified the judgment to hold that the
complaint was dismissed because the trial court had no
jurisdiction stating:
"If it finds that there was not such residence
it has no power to further act as to the marriage
contract and if it acts in such regard it exceeds its
authority."
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The action there had to be filed in the County where
the plaintiff resided. The action here had to be filed in
the County where the work was to be performed. In each
case, the Legislature, for sound legislative reasons, imposed
the statutory conditions. In either case, the District Court
has no jurisdiction to proceed unless the statutory condition
has been satisfied. Admittedly, there has been no compliance here. The court, therefore, properly dismissed the action below.
c)

Appellant's claimed right of action under said
statutory provisions is barred by the special
statute of limitations contained therein.

Former Title 14, Chapter 1 provided in Section 2 specifically that aetion be commenced not later than one year
after the "completion and final settlement" of the contract.
The Utah Supreme Court in State, et al. v. Campbell Building Co., et al., 94 Utah 326, 77 P. 2d 341 stated as follows
with respect to the proper interpretation and application
of this language :
"Final settlement within the statute does not
mean final payment or final disposition of all matters under the contract. The time of final settlement is the time when the obligee in the bond, the
state, has administratively determined that performance under the contract has been made by the
contractor, and the obligee has determined the
amount due under the contract; that is, the obligee
has determined whether or not it has any claims
to assert against the surety because of the contractor's failure to perform according to his obligations
under the contract.
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*

*

"'Final settlement' under the statute is the
determination by the obligee as to whether it has
any claims against the contractor, and what it considers it owes the contractor. This could not be
affected by the fact that the contractor may not
agree with the determination. The most essential
thing is whether the obligee asserts a right to recover under the bond on a claim against the ~on
tractor, except as such amount may affect the
claim, if any, it asserts against the surety under
the bond. The question as to whether there has
been a 'final settlement' is not affected by the acceptance or rejection of the statement by the contractor."
Applying this test to the uncontroverted facts before
the court at the hearing of the respective motions of the
parties for summary judgment, it is dear that the date of
"completion and final settlement" of the contract here involved was May 2, 1963. On that date, D. Gordon Stringham, being duly authorized, and acting for and on behalf
of the State of Utah by and through the State Road Commission, the obligee on the bond, made each of the required
administrative determinations (R. 42-3) :
1) The contractor completed performance of the contract on December 13, 1962.
2) The State of Utah had no claims to assert against
either the contractor or its surety.
3)

The amount due the contractor.

The court in the Campbell case at pages 333-4 of the
Utah Reporter sets out verbatim the pertinent testimony
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of the representative of the obligee. A comparison of that
testimony with the affidavit of Mr. Stringham on file in
this matter demonstrates that identical determinations
were made in each case. The estimate prepared in the case
at bar by Mr. Stringham is designated "15 and final" (R.
44). It was the final administrative determination by the
obligee, and at the date thereof, the statute of limitations
commenced to run.
The case at bar is much stronger than the Campbell
case in that here the "estimate invoice" attached to the
supplemental affidavit of D. Gordon Stringham demonstrates that the administrative determination by the State
of Utah was accepted and approved by the contractor and
was paid by the obligee (R. 43-4). In the Campbell case,
the contractor objected to the final estimate and in subsequent litigation demonstrated that the administrative determination initially made in the State's estimate was incorrect. Notwithstanding this fact, the court in the Campbell case ruled that the "completion and final settlement",
as contemplated by the statute, was the date upon which
such administrative determination initially was made by
the State Road Commission.
In its Brief, Appellant seeks to follow two separate
escape routes to avoid facing the uncontroverted facts
which establish of record the "final settlement" date.
Neither route is open to it. First, at page 3 of the Brief,
Appellant tells the court that the "completion and final
settlement" date is a "disputed fact". However, the existence of this claimed "disputed fact" did not preclude
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Appellant below from praying for summary judgment, relying upon the various affidavits of D. Gordon Stringham
(R. 35-6, 42-3, 46-7), and affirmatively asserting to the
court below "there is no genuine issue as to any material
fact" (R. 37). It is pertinent here to note also that the
affidavits submitted by Appellant in support of its motion
for s.ummary judgment do not relate to any "common-law"
claim, but establish facts material only to the statutory
claim.
We submit that the action of Appellant below brings
this case within the teachings of Mastic Tile Division of
the Ruberoid Company v. Acme Distributing Company,
Feb. 1964, 15 Utah 2d 136, 389 P. 2d 56. There, as here,
both parties submitted the issues on documentary evidence
to the trial court inviting summary judgment. There, as
here, after entry of summary judgment, one of the parties
claimed that disputed facts existed. In discussing such
claim, this court stated:
"Both sides laid the matter in the lap of the
court by their mutual motions, and under the facts
of this particular case unequivocally invited and
authorized the court to decide the case by interpreting the documents. This the court did. Having done
so in a case like this, where interpretation of the
writings was the only issue, we do not think the
court should be required to submit to the subsequent
urging of the loser that although he took his chances
without reservation, he must have another go at
the case, - although it is conceivable that in some
other and unusual case this might be so."
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The second route of attempted escape is by inaccurate
statement of claimed fact. At page 15 of the Brief, Appellant glibly states that the "complete performance and final
settlement" date was "May 21, 1963". The facts establish
by the record in this regard are summarized as follows :
1) In paragraph 5 of his first affidavit, D. Gordon
Stringham states the conclusion that "date of complete
performance and final settlement" was "May 21, 1963"
(R. 36).
2) In paragraph 2 of his supplemental affidavit (R.
42-3), Mr. Stringham "supplements and amends" paragraph 5 of his prior affidavit "relating to his conclusion
as to the date of 'complete performance and final settlement' " by setting forth the underlying facts. Those facts
are:
(a)

Contract was completed on December 13, 1962.

(b)

Determination of amount due from the obligee
to the contractor and that the obligee had no
claims against either the contractor or the surety
was made on May 2, 1963.

( c)

Letter was mailed on May 21, 1963 indicating
approval for payment after acceptance of the
State's "15 and final" estimate by the contractor.

3) In paragraph 2 of Mr. Stringham's "second supplemental affidavit" (R. 46-7), he reiterates that the
obligee's final estimate (made on May 2, 1963) "constitutes a determination by the Commission that it has no
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claims to assert against the contractor or its surety and
the amount due to the contractor".
We submit that under the doctrine of the Campbell
case, these facts demonstrate conclusively that the "final
settlement" date was May 2, 1963.
Appellant's action below admittedly was not filed
within one year after May 2, 1963. The action, therefore,
is barred by the very statute upon which it purports to be
based and the complaint below was properly dismissed.
POINT IV.
APPELLANT IS NOT ENTITLED TO RECOVERY AGAINST RESPONDENTS UNDER THE
PROVISIONS OF TITLE 14, CHAPTER 1, SECTIONS 5-9, UTAH CODE ANNOTATED, 1953.
Effective May 14, 1963, Title 14, Chapter 1, Sections
1-4, Utah Code Annotated, 1953 was repealed and a new
public contract bonding statute was enacted in its place
which is now contained in Title 14, Chapter 1, Sections
5-9. Assuming for purposes of this discussion, that the
provisions of the new statute are controlling, Appellant's
action below still was properly dismissed. Appellant failed
to comply with three mandatory requirements of the new
statute which will be discussed below:
a)

Appellant did not comply with the notice requirements of said statutory provisions.

Title 14, Chapter 1, Section 6, Utah Code Annotated,
1953 sets forth jurisdictional notice requirements and pro·
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vides that the claimant "shall not have a right of action
upon such payment bond" unless he has given the prescribed notice. Since the record contains no averment of
compliance with such requirements, Appellant had no right
of action under the bonding statute which was in effect at
the time this action was filed.
b)

The District Court in Salt Lake County had
no jurisdiction to hear the subject action for
the reason that an action upon the bond must
be filed in an appropriate court in the political subdivision in which the contract was to
be performed.

Again, the complaint avers and the fact is uncontroverted that the contract here involved was to be performed
in Daggett County, State of Utah. Title 14, Chapter 1,
Section 6 requires that "every suit instituted" on the statutory bond "shall be brought in the appropriate court in
the political subdivision in which the contract was to be
performed, and not elsewhere". The same arguments apply to this statutory provision which were made under
Point III hereof, sub-paragraph b. It follows that the District Court of Salt Lake County had no jurisdiction to entertain this particular action under the provisions of the
new statute.
c)

Appellant's claimed right of action, if processed under said statutory provisions, would
be barred by the special statute of limitations contaUried therein.
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Title 14, Chapter 1, Section 7, Utah Code Annotated
'
1953 provides in pertinent part:

"* * * Provided, however, that no such
suit shall be commenced after the expiration of one
year .from the date on which the plaintiff performed
the last of the labor or furnished or supplied the
last of the materials for which the suit is brought,
except, that if the claimant is a subcontrador of the
contractor, no such suit shall be commenced after
the expiration of one year from the date on which
final payment under the subcontract became due."
The claimant here was not a subcontractor of the contractor. The claimant was a materialman who supplied
petroleum products to a subcontractor; hence, the one year
statute of limitations commenced to run upon the date
when Appellant supplied the last petroleum products to the
subcontractor. Attached to the affidavit of W. L. Olsen
filed in support of Appellant's motion for summary judgment are statements demonstrating that the last petroleum
products were supplied to the subcontractor on December
10, 1962. Therefore, it was required to file its action under the terms of the new statute on or before December 10,
1963. Having failed to do so, the action was barred by the
special statute of limitations contained in the statute.
CONCLUSION
Appellant here filed a complaint asserting a statutory
cause of action. Neither the complaint nor any other document contained in the record on appeal would reasonably
apprise the adverse parties or the court that Appellant de-
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sired in the alternative to assert a common-law third party
beneficiary claim.
The record demonstrates and the court below found
that Appellant did not comply with required statutory conditions. The statutory remedies are exclusive. The provisions of the public contract bonding statutes (both old and
new) preclude recovery under the facts of this case.
Through this appeal, the Appellant seeks to amend
its pleadings, to assert a new cause of action and to obtain
automatic judgment - this without the aid of averment
or proof. It should not be permitted so to do.
We submit that the order and judgment entered by
the court below from which this appeal is taken was duly
and properly entered and should be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,
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